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Abstract
COVID-19 has brought to light the severity of economic inequalities by testing the capacity of the poorest families to make 
ends meet. Food insecurity has in fact soared all over the UK, with many people forced to rely on food support providers to 
not go hungry. This paper uses a unique dataset on 55 food support organizations active in Greater Manchester during the 
first COVID-19 wave, and 41 semi-structured interviews with food aid spokespersons and stakeholders, to shed light on what 
they overcame, the complications and drawbacks of the food emergency response plan put in place. The results indicate that 
food aid organizations that remained open were surprisingly effective despite the growth in user demand and the decrease 
in volunteers. However, the necessity to maintain a timely supply food at all costs came with important drawbacks. The 
lockdown measures that followed COVID-19 not only affected the financial stability and management of the organizations, 
and the availability of food, but undermined the ways in which food support providers used to operate. Owing to physical 
distancing measures and to the increasing numbers of users, more or less intangible forms of support such as financial advice, 
empathic listening and human warmth were partially lost, probably when they were needed more than ever.
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Abbreviations
VCSE  The voluntary, community and social enterprise 
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Introduction
The outbreak of COVID-19 and the lockdown measures that 
followed had a significant impact on our food systems and 
soon became a litmus test for the extreme inequalities of 
our times. Disruption to food supply chains, loss of income 
and livelihoods and uneven food price trends in localised 
contexts affected food security and nutrition all over the 
world (Clapp and Moseley 2020). On the production side, 
the crisis highlighted how much the EU’s agricultural out-
put relies on exploitation of the migrant labour force, with 
governments quickly having to embark on policies to secure 
the food supply chain by granting temporary working per-
mits to farm workers (Barling 2020; Neef 2020). Concur-
rently, while many families were stockpiling and increasing 
their expenditure on food (Dickinson 2020; Wilson 2020), 
the most vulnerable struggled to make ends meet. A recent 
survey by the European Food Banks Federation (FEBA 
2020) showed that demand for emergency food assistance 
increased in every European country and even doubled in the 
UK. Although the UK Government (2020a) stressed ‘we are 
all in this together’ as a national motto to foster solidarity 
and cohesion, some were much further ‘in’ than the rest.1 
Such universalistic claims not only fall short in recognising 
how diverse people’s capabilities to face a major crisis can 
be but also limit our possibility to rethink the right to good 
and sustainable food (Moragues-Faus 2020). * Filippo Oncini  filippo.oncini@manchester.ac.uk
1 Sustainable Consumption Institute and Department 
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1 Interestingly, the same phrase was used by the Conservative–Lib-
eral Democrat coalition government to justify the austerity measures 




In fact, COVID-19 has brought to light the severity of 
economic inequalities by testing the capacity of poorer fami-
lies to feed themselves. Food insecurity—the ‘limited, inad-
equate or insecure access to food due to financial resource 
constraints’ (Tarasuk 2001, p. 2)—has in fact soared all over 
the UK, putting to test the capacity of its retrenching welfare 
state. Recent estimates suggest that around 3 million people 
live in households where someone has to skip some meals, 
while food insecurity has quadrupled, extending to 16% of 
the British population (Loopstra 2020). This unprecedented 
crisis has prompted a massive response by the voluntary, 
community and social enterprise sector (VCSE), which has 
been at the forefront of food support provision since 2010 
in light of the consequences of the austerity measures taken 
after the Great Recession (Loopstra et al. 2015; Garthwaite 
2016a). The Trussell Trust, the Salvation Army and the 
Independent Food Aid Network (IFAN), to name just a few 
well-known food aid networks, all reported a growth in the 
number of requests for food parcels, and during the early 
days of the first lockdown called for food and monetary 
donations, fearing that these would probably drop (Barker 
and Russell 2020). For instance, IFAN food banks reported 
a 177% increase in the number of three-day emergency food 
parcels distributed in May 2020, comparing this with May 
2019 (IFAN 2020).
Although the COVID-19 crisis tested the viability of 
many VCSE organizations, those that were able to remain 
open made gigantic efforts to keep pace with requests for 
food aid while observing physical distance requirements and 
maintaining logistics to reach all those in need. However, 
evidence on how food support providers have tackled the 
crisis is mostly anecdotal, or based on single case studies 
or time-sensitive accounts (e.g. Barker and Russell 2020; 
Power et al. 2020), and still lacking is a systematic analysis 
of their reaction to it. Seeking to fill this gap, this paper uses 
a unique dataset on 55 food support organizations based in 
Greater Manchester, and 41 semi-structured interviews with 
food aid spokespersons and stakeholders, to shed light on the 
obstacles they faced and the needs that emerged immediately 
after the epidemic’s peak. After a brief introduction on food 
support provision in the UK, I outline the strategy I used 
to collect data. I then present my findings, distinguishing 
between three different outcomes of the response to the cri-
sis: successfully overcoming these obstacles, complications 
arising and restrictions. Overall, the results indicate that food 
aid organizations that remained open during the crisis were 
surprisingly effective despite the growth of user demand and 
the decrease in volunteers. However, the need to maintain 
the supply of food at all costs brought important drawbacks. 
The lockdown measures that followed COVID-19 not only 
affected the financial stability and the management of these 
organizations, and the availability of food, but actually 
undermined the ways in which most food support providers 
used to operate. In fact, owing to physical distancing and 
to the increasing numbers of users, more or less intangible 
forms of support such as financial advice, empathic listening 
and human warmth were partially or totally lost, probably 
when they were needed more than ever.
Food support provision in the UK
The aftermath of the Great Recession has been characterised 
by the rise of food insecurity and food charities all over 
Europe (Lambie-Mumford and Silvasti 2020). In the UK, 
following cuts in welfare services, reforms of social secu-
rity payments, benefit sanctioning, and growing disconnect 
between food prices and wages, food insecurity has reached 
staggering proportions (Hartfree 2014; Loopstra et al. 2016, 
2018, 2019a; Reeves et al. 2017). In 2017, a study surveying 
a representative sample of the population in England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland found that 13% of participants lived 
in marginally food secure households and 8% lived in low 
or very low food secure households (Bates et al. 2017). The 
escalation in the number of people unable to access enough 
food to sustain an active and healthy life has been paralleled 
by the rise of food banks, charities that depend on monetary 
and food donations to provide emergency food parcels that 
can be taken home for free by people in need. For instance, 
the Trussell Trust Foodbank Network—the UK’s largest 
food bank organization—declared that between 2015 and 
2020 the distribution of three-day emergency food parcels 
increased by 74%, from 1,112,395 to 1,900,122 (Trussell 
Trust 2020). Similarly, in a recent IFAN report Loopstra 
et al. (2019b) found that 75% of independent food banks 
started operating between 2010 and 2018, with over a third 
opening between 2012 and 2013.
Food banks have been widely criticized, as studies indi-
cate that they are often unable to provide nutritionally ade-
quate and balanced food, and that users often feel shame, 
stigma and embarrassment about being seen as incapable to 
provide for their families (Bazerghi et al. 2016; Garthwaite 
2016b; Purdam et al. 2016). Moreover, despite being thought 
of as short-term safety nets, food banks are more and more 
used by those experiencing long-term deprivation as a com-
plementary—and in some cases unique—form of social 
security (Bazerghi et al. 2016). At the same time, it is unde-
niable that without food banks many more people would 
experience hunger. And arguably, the depth of contemporary 
poverty in Britain would be less visible without them, as 
food banks also act as advocates for the development of a 
more equitable welfare regime and food system. Thus, the 
argument over the justification for food aid has stalled in 
an ethical cul-de-sac: their institutionalization partly legiti-
mates a problematic transition from cash to food transfers, 
but at the same time could encourage and coordinate wider 
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food justice campaigns (Williams et al. 2016). This ambiva-
lence comes to light in the provisioning practices of many 
food banks: on the one hand, the use of intrusive assessment 
procedures, vouchers and referral systems contributes to the 
bureaucratisation of the sector, which is becoming more and 
more akin to a welfare apparatus, and to the perpetuation of 
the distinction between the deserving and the undeserving 
poor (Garthwaite 2016a, b; May et al. 2019); on the other 
hand, food banks also offer a ‘space of care’ characterised 
by acceptance, moral support, generosity, hospitality and 
advice, as well as a ‘liminal space’ of encounter’ between 
marginal groups, volunteers and staff members that could 
potentially lead to new political and ethical engagements 
(Cloke et al. 2017).
Possibly because of their spreading, media presence, 
data availability, and reports production, scholarly and pub-
lic debates in Europe tend to concentrate on food banks as 
the prevailing form of food aid (Lambie-Mumford 2019; 
Lambie-Mumford and Loopstra 2020). Yet food aid is a het-
erogeneous field of assistance that encompasses ‘a range of 
large-scale and small local activities aiming to help people 
meet food needs, often on a short-term basis during crisis 
or immediate difficulty;’ (Lambie-Mumford and Loopstra 
2020, p. 200). As well as food banks, we should include 
holiday hunger programmes, community kitchens, soup 
vans and food pantries (Lambie-Mumford 2019). In fact, 
the whole food-charity sector has expanded over the last 
decade. Although food insecurity and initiatives to ‘feed 
the poor’ have a long history in the UK (Glennerster et al. 
2004), the scale, scope and professionalisation of food aid 
is a recent phenomenon, overlapping with the expansion of 
the third sector, which is increasingly presented as an institu-
tion that can fight social exclusion, reinvigorate civil society 
and encourage active citizenship (Fyfe 2005). Expansion, 
however, does not automatically ensure that organizations 
are able to offer the same services and food provision stand-
ards. Rather, different opportunities in accessing volunteers, 
donations and food redistribution schemes contribute to the 
creation of ‘an uneven geography of “scarcity” that reflects 
the unequal distribution of wealth at the local and regional 
level’ (May et al. 2020, p. 213).
The institutionalization of food aid has been further 
cemented by presenting (recovery of) food surplus and 
(reduction of) food poverty as a ‘win–win’ situation (Caplan 
2017; Lohnes and Wilson 2018) capable of improving 
resource efficiency and environmental sustainability while 
addressing the needs of the most disadvantaged, thus 
responding simultaneously to two United Nations Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs): SDG 12 ‘Ensuring sus-
tainable consumption and production patterns’, which aims 
to halve per capita food waste and reduce food losses; and 
SDG 2, ‘Ending hunger and ensuring access by all people, 
the poor and the vulnerable to safe, nutritious and sufficient 
food’ (Arcuri 2019; Galli et al. 2019).2
In this light, it is not surprising that the repercussions of 
the lockdown on the most disadvantaged have been almost 
entirely managed by charities and especially by food sup-
port providers. In a sense, there was no other apparatus as 
ready, skilled and qualified as the VCSE for tackling the rap-
idly rising levels of food insecurity, as the state was already 
directing vulnerable citizens to charitable food provision 
before COVID-19 (Garthwaite 2016a). As elsewhere in 
Europe, the crisis further cemented the controversial alli-
ance between supermarkets and food charities, as many food 
support providers started or reinvigorated their collabora-
tion with corporates (FEBA 2020; Power et al. 2020). In 
point of fact, during schools closure the UK government’s 
national distribution of supermarket vouchers worth £15 per 
week per eligible child suffered delays (Weale and Murray 
2020) whereas the £20-a-week temporary increase to uni-
versal credit, though welcomed by charities, was not suf-
ficient to prevent people on low incomes falling into hard-
ship (Butler 2020a).3 Concurrently, the establishment of a 
£3.25 million fund for food redistribution organizations—de 
facto designed to strengthen the food supply of charities in 
a moment of mounting requests—seemed to confirm that 
responsibility was also—and perhaps mainly—on the shoul-
ders of the third sector.
The case of Greater Manchester well exemplifies this 
process. Aware of the high poverty levels throughout 
the county (IGAU 2017), at the start of the epidemic the 
metropolis combined supply (of food aid coordinated by the 
local authority) with the organization of demand by setting 
up an application portal that gathered data on local food 
support providers and residents in need of support.4 Even 
more indicative was the opening of a council-led temporary 
food bank in Openshaw in partnership with both voluntary 
and private organizations. The service started door-to-door 
delivery of emergency parcels during the first weeks of the 
lockdown, totalling around 30,000 requests from March to 
May (Manchester City Council 2020). The unprecedented 
2 More than a win–win situation, the interdependence between food 
surplus and food poverty should be seen as a zero-sum game: that is, 
the utility each participant gains or loses is exactly balanced by the 
utility the other participants lose or gain. While donating food surplus 
certainly represents a gain for companies—they avoid paying for dis-
posal and improve their brand reputation—for most poor individuals 
receiving surplus food entails a loss of personal dignity, self-esteem 
and freedom of choice.
3 This is further suggested by charities’ plea to continue the 
£20-a-week COVID boost, as according to a recent Trussell Trust 
report its withdrawal would pull 700,000 more people into poverty 
(Weekes et al. 2020).
4 See https:// surve ys. tfgm. com/ snapw ebhost/ s. asp?k= 15874 83916 26. 
Accessed 29 Mar 2021.
1204 F. Oncini 
1 3
and generous effort put in place by public and private institu-
tions has been justly celebrated by the press, which under-
lined the importance and the effectiveness of the third sector 
acting locally throughout the lockdown. This accolade is 
mostly based on commentary and anecdotes, however, and 
so might depict the evolution of the emergency response 
without attending to its problematic facets.
Data and methods
Data collection
This study is based on a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of data gathered by the author between 
June and August 2020.5 Survey data were collected to obtain 
standardized information on the characteristics of different 
food support providers and on the impact of COVID-19 on 
their operations. Starting from the open-data map of food 
support providers created by Greater Manchester Poverty 
Action (GMPA),6 I first extracted the datasheet containing 
contact details for 222 services connected with food aid 
throughout Greater Manchester. To this dataset I added the 
details of 26 food support providers found on the Mutual 
Aid Groups Map,7 and 9 others were reached by sending 
a link to the questionnaire in the GMPA newsletter,8 to 
get as close as possible to the statistical population. The 
contact database was then shared with a research agency 
that administered the questionnaire via CATI (Computer-
Assisted Telephone Interviewing) or CAWI (Computer-
Assisted Web Interviewing) once operators had spoken to 
directors or spokespersons.9 All calls were preceded by an 
email supplying a participant information sheet of the pro-
ject, and information on how to give consent. At the end of 
the questionnaire, participants were invited to a one-hour 
Zoom interview with the author, to enable me to dig deeper 
into some aspects of the COVID-19 crisis and discuss the 
history and characteristics of the organization before the epi-
demic. Additional stakeholders working in the field of food 
aid (e.g. directors of charities that distribute funding, experts 
in food surplus redistribution, members of advocacy groups) 
were also recruited so I could gather additional evidence and 
discuss some of the patterns that emerged in previous con-
versations. All the interviews were recorded, anonymized, 
then transcribed verbatim. Participants who decided to fill in 
the questionnaire and/or participate in interviews received a 
small incentive in the form of charity donation.
Sample selection and data analysis
The list of 257 food support providers contained 33 dupli-
cates. Enquiries revealed that 41 did not provide food sup-
port or any type of aid; and 73 did not respond to several 
attempts to reach them, or their contact details were out 
of date. This latter group may have consisted of organiza-
tions that had to shut down for lack of volunteers or suit-
able spaces to reorganize support. Eventually, 55 directors/
spokespersons participated in the survey and 55 either 
refused, or I could not secure a CATI/CAWI interview (50% 
of the ‘active’ population). Among the survey participants, 
30 agreed to the follow-up interview via Zoom. The 12 addi-
tional stakeholders were additionally recruited by the author 
using personal contacts and snowball sampling.
Figure 1 illustrates the composition of the participants in 
the survey and the interviews. In both cases, this is rather 
heterogeneous, as they include both Trussell Trust and inde-
pendent food banks (whether or not part of the IFAN), and 
also food clubs/pantries and warm meal providers.10 The 
‘mixed’ category describes organizations combining more 
than one model (e.g. providing warm breakfasts and a food 
pantry). This achieves a composite picture of the situation 
by considering perspectives from organizations working in 
the same field but with different resources and modes of 
intervention.
Collection of the data proceeded simultaneously and 
interactively with analysis.11 In what follows, I will present 
descriptive statistics and some emblematic excerpts from 
the interviews (all names are pseudonyms) to illustrate three 
main outcomes of the response to the crisis: obstacles over-
come, complications and restrictions.
6 The map is available at the following link: https:// www. gmpov ertya 
ction. org/ maps/ (Accessed 29 Mar 2021). Although data are kindly 
provided at no charge by the GMPA, I informed the charity about the 
study and its members, along with other advocacy groups and chari-
ties, contributed to the questionnaire layout before starting data col-
lection. The author’s preliminary reports on the data are also avail-
able on the GMPA’s website.
7 See https:// covid mutua laid. org/ local- groups/. Accessed 29 Mar 
2021.
8 This strategy allowed to reach also those food support providers 
that asked not to be included in the GMPA map but regularly receive 
the newsletter.
9 The full questionnaire is available upon request. The dataset is 
embargoed for two years, and will be made freely available from 
October 2023. Preliminary access to aggregate data is available upon 
request.
10 Food clubs/pantries provide access to groceries—usually every 
week—for payment of a small subscription fee, while warm meal pro-
viders are organizations that distribute cooked meals or operate free 
access canteens.
11 Table A1 in the supplemental material summarises the questions 
and response categories used in the data analysis.
5 The research obtained ethical clearance from the University of 
Manchester Ethics Committee. The ethics application with details on 
data processing and security is available upon request.




The sudden increase in requests for emergency food could 
have put a strain on the capacity of food support providers 
to successfully meet the surge in demand. Table 1 shows, 
however, that during the first and most problematic weeks 
of the crisis, very few organizations had to turn eligible 
people away for any of the reasons listed. More than 80% 
of the respondents declared that they have never turned 
eligible people away on account of a lack of food stocks 
or organizational resources (volunteers and staff). Interest-
ingly, almost no one responded that people were turned 
away due to a lack of valid food vouchers (92.7%). Stud-
ies before COVID-19 illustrated that people in need had 
to face bureaucratic hurdles and racialised calculations of 
deservingness in order to become eligible (de Souza 2019; 
May et al. 2019). During the crisis, however, it is possi-
ble that most providers renounced or reduced eligibility 
checks and procedures to streamline the distribution. Cru-
cially, when forced to turn people away, users were often 
redirected to other providers with greater capacity, so that 
at no point during the crisis has there been an overall lack 
of food.
Two concomitant factors contributed to this outcome. On 
one hand, repeated calls on the generosity of individuals and 
businesses (especially food retailers), as well as the UK gov-
ernment fund for food redistribution, injected the resources 
necessary to keep the food support system running. In fact, 
many organizations experienced an increase in donations 
of food (76.4% of sample) or money (67.3%) (see Table 2), 
with 85.5% (47 cases) reporting one of the two and more 
than half reporting both (32 cases, 58.2%). Interestingly, 
only four participants reported a fall in the nutritional value 
of the food distributed, whilst the majority (65.5%) reported 
no change. Surprisingly, 15 organizations saw an increase: 
while urgency could have resulted in a lower concern for 
food quality, it is likely that the rise in food and monetary 
donations had positive side effects on the heterogeneity of 
the food supplied to some providers and, in turn, on the 
overall quality of the groceries distributed.
On the other hand, providers demonstrated great resil-
ience, with 89.2% of participants believing that the organi-
zation could recover and adapt quickly (Table 3). In fact, 
as soon as the lockdown was introduced by the government 
on 23 March 2020, organizations found ways to maintain 
Fig. 1  Composition of the 



















Trussell Trust food bank
Sample composition
Survey Interview
Table 1  How often 
organizations turned people 
away
During the last few weeks, how often have you 




Volunteers Lack of 
valid food 
voucher
n % n % n % n %
Frequently 3 5.5 2 3.6 3 5.5 1 1.8
Occasionally 1 1.8 4 7.3 3 5.5 2 3.6
Rarely 3 5.5 3 5.5 4 7.3 1 1.8
Never 48 87.3 46 83.6 45 81.8 51 92.7
Total 55 100 55 100 55 100 55 100
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existing food support channels. In some cases, as the fol-
lowing quotations from a food bank and a warm meal pro-
vider show, the transition was relatively smooth:
The first change was that we stopped doing hot drinks 
and we were still making the parcels as needed, but 
we were just minimising all the extra stuff that went 
around it. Then we changed to… people would just 
come to the front door, they wouldn’t come in to the 
building. And all of the parcels would be pre-made. 
And we would just distribute those, just take the 
voucher, give them a bag. So it was really… the con-
tact was really minimal. And that was through maybe 
the end of March and the beginning of April. And 
then I think the first day that we decided... or the first 
day that we started doing deliveries, I think it was 
the 13th of April. Or it was, like, that week. So we 
started doing three days of deliveries per week… I 
think, to be honest, so far things have gone relatively 
smoothly. Which feels a little bit suspicious, it feels 
a little bit... we kind of haven’t really... I think we’re 
at a massive advantage because we have three of us 
[Young people. Ed.], which means we’ve been able 
to respond to everything a lot more quickly. Annie, 
Trussell Trust food bank
So, once we became aware it was an issue, we sort 
of planned very quickly that we wouldn’t be able to 
carry on doing our normal sit-down meals with peo-
ple. That’s before the lockdown came in or anything 
like that, we just knew that wasn’t going to happen 
so we did plan to be, to cook at the venue still and 
then for people to come and collect takeaways. We 
did that for one week and then we realised that that 
wasn’t really going to work very well and then the 
following week, after they introduced the lockdown 
bit anyway, so we wouldn’t have been able to carry 
on doing that anyway… We use the upstairs space 
that’s empty to sort it and bag it and we have delivery 
drivers going out to deliver it around to the people 
who have been referred to us. Bill, Warm meal pro-
vider
Most food support providers were very agile in respond-
ing to the new necessities. As Annie’s words illustrate, the 
possibility of working with young colleagues who were not 
at high risk of COVID-19 complications, allowed one food 
bank to quickly modulate the service to respond to needs, to 
an extent that felt ‘a bit suspicious’, given the times. Simi-
larly, many other food banks and smaller providers immedi-
ately set up points for picking up food and often temporary, 
door-to-door delivery services, while most food pantries 
remained open by making users observe the ‘same physical 
distancing’ and hygiene measures required in supermarkets. 
Some warm meal providers started to deliver cooked food or 
temporarily began distributing food parcels, using premises 
to accommodate food stocks, as Bill indicates. This transi-
tion was not always easy, for instance when providers were 
mainly people in their 60 s and 70 s. Even in such cases, 
however, some were able to find informal and ‘personal’ 
ways to remain open:
The two big problems that I’ve got with COVID is, 
first of all, my volunteers are all over 70. So they can’t 
continue. You know, they’ve got to... I’m healthy, I’m 
healthy as anything, as is my wife. But the simple sta-
tistic that says, if somebody over 70 gets it they’re 200 
times more likely to die than if somebody at 50 gets 
it… So I’m guiding myself and my wife, and wonder-
ful that my children are servicing us, and we’re getting 
the Tesco deliveries. That’s how we’re dealing with it 
Table 2  Changes in donations 
and nutritional value
Thinking about the following aspects of your organization, how have 











n % n % n %
Decreased 8 14.5 10 18.2 4 7.3
Stayed the same 10 18.2 3 5.5 36 65.5
Increased 37 67.3 42 76.4 15 27.3
Total 55 100 55 100 55 100
Table 3  Resilience to the COVID-19 crisis
How resilient do you feel your organization is 
likely to be against the COVID-19 crisis?
n %
Very resilient 23 41.8
Fairly resilient 26 47.3
Not very resilient 3 5.5
Not at all resilient 1 1.8
Don’t know/Refused 2 4.6
Total 55 100
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personally… Now it’s just an odd... I’ve done a food 
bank thing with him. Somebody was critical for some 
food, I just sent my son to the shop to buy some food 
and then he got... well, he delivered that. Chris, Inde-
pendent food bank
Like many other food support providers run by elderly 
volunteers, Chris’s food bank would have interrupted the 
service if not for his son, who took care of the delivery ser-
vice and kept providing food for those in need. This illus-
trates the social commitment and dedication brought even 
to smaller and more informal food support providers, who 
probably explored all the alternatives to ceasing activity.
Complications
The extraordinary success of food aid services in tackling 
the crisis did not come without its challenges. Although, 
as we have seen, many providers just switched mode of 
provision overnight to guarantee an adequate and timely 
supply of food, the pressure overload on the whole system 
created three main complications. First, many participants 
reported experiencing some shortage of staff members, and 
especially in volunteers. Only 52.7% declared that lack of 
staff had not been an issue and 40.0% that lack of volunteers 
was not an issue (Table 4). This is not surprising, as before 
the pandemic most independent food banks relied on five 
or more volunteers (Loopstra et al. 2019c). Although very 
few reported that shortage was a major issue, this may have 
implied a higher workload on the personnel at work during 
the crisis. As Delia, from an independent food bank, states:
The amount of food that we get donated has 
increased. People are aware of us now. We get a lot 
of publicity on Facebook, a lot of fundraising. But 
you know, the downside is that we’re getting a lot 
more people that need our service. We’re working 
with a lot of different agencies now. People come 
and collect emergency parcels for people and things 
like that. And we’ve had to change how we work, 
because we only ever used to attend the food bank 
on a Monday and a Friday, whereas because now a 
lot of our volunteers have had to self-isolate, we’ve 
had to spread the work out that we do over the whole 
week. Because there’s so much to do now with so 
few volunteers. Delia, Independent food bank
Second, the fact that there was enough food to feed 
everyone does not mean that providers did not experience 
food shortages. As Table 4 indicates, only 32.7% stated 
that the organization experienced no problem of any sort, 
while more than 16% reported high levels of shortages. 
Figure 2 summarizes the items lacking from providers’ 
shelves: unsurprisingly, canned items are among the 
ones mentioned most often, probably because of the high 
demand for them, given their shelf-life. Interestingly how-
ever, lack of fresh products such as meat, cheese, fruit and 
vegetables were also reported, probably owing to short 
supply and/or costs and challenges in transportation (e.g. 
maintaining the cold chain).
Third, and connected, the higher pressure on the resources 
available to the providers has increased the uncertainty 
around their capacity to survive in the longer term—espe-
cially in view of a second wave. As Table 5 illustrates, 38.2% 
of food support providers reported that food stocks would 
last for four weeks or less (and 14.5% reported that cash 
reserves would last four weeks or less), while 5–8 weeks’ 
stock was reported by 7.3% and 5–8 weeks’ cash reserves 
by 9.1%.
Thus, although managing to address food poverty, provid-
ers have entered a precarious phase, especially the smallest 
organizations, often needing new venues to operate safely. 
The open-ended question in the survey ‘What are the imme-
diate needs of the food provider?’ prompted these fears to 
be voiced:
Probably the funding to come in continuously. As 
far as the needs of food, we are purchasing as we go. 
There are other places like churches and community 
centres that are supporting us with constant donations. 
At the moment it is continuous support. That means 
donations and financial donations. Both are important 
right now, but it is very difficult to get things in bulk as 
there are shortages of things. Eric, Food pantry
Table 4  Reported shortages Is the organization short of: Staff members Volunteers Food
n % n % n %
1 Not at all 29 52.7 22 40.0 18 32.7
2 14 25.5 13 23.6 12 21.8
3 2 3.6 12 21.8 16 29.1
4 5 9.1 6 10.9 5 9.1
5 Very much so 5 9.1 2 3.6 4 7.3
Total 55 100 55 100 55 100
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Finance; the government money hasn’t come anywhere 
near us and even if we have written a bid for it the peo-
ple reading it don’t understand charity finance. Also, 
the funding from central government was odd, large 
amounts were given to national organizations which 
don’t have the means to distribute locally and then 
other funders won’t fund the same areas even if you 
haven’t been successful. Which has meant very little 
money has come down for basic stuff like buying food. 
Fiona, Independent food bank
Immediate needs would be finance, I suppose. For staff 
and resources to reach our services, like PPE [Personal 
protective equipment. Ed.] and perspex stuff. We need 
funding for the charity to pay our staff and get them off 
furlough. Geraldine, Independent food bank
What we need is a permanent base of operations. 
We are using someone else’s premises that they have 
closed due to COVID and they have given to us. 
When they reopen we will have to move out. It is all 
space, we have just reviewed what we are doing, we 
are rethinking our overall strategy. Harry, Warm meal 
provider
This corresponds with several independent reports that 
came out during the same period, highlighting the risk of 
bankruptcy and that many UK charities expect income to 
reduce (Butler, 2020b) despite the £750 million package of 
support offered by the government in April (UK Govern-
ment 2020b).
Restrictions
Participants described both obstacles overcome in, and com-
plications stemming from, the impact the virus outbreak 
had on several aspects of their organizations. As Table 6 
sums up, a small minority of the respondents declared that 
COVID-19 had no impact at all on the financial stability 
(12.7%), the management (14.5%) or the functioning (9.1%) 
of their organization, while a substantial proportion (25.5%, 
38.2%, 54.5% respectively) chose the opposite response cat-
egory. As we have seen, the necessity to rapidly adapt to the 
new conditions to respond effectively to increasing demand 
came at the cost of uncertainty, precarity and higher work-
load. Yet more critical was the cumulative effect of such a 
frantic rearrangement on the ‘social ingredient’ at the core 
of any form of support. As reported elsewhere (May et al. 
2019, p. 714), food charities are ambivalent spaces, ‘char-
acterized by complex interconnectivities between shame 
and gratitude, stigma and acceptance, moral judgement and 
emotional support.’ Critical aspects related to the ways in 
which food support providers evaluate eligibility and dis-
tribute foods are therefore weaved with methods of offering 
emotional and practical support that are often crucial for 
many people in need. They can offer much more than food 
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Most mentioned food items
Table 5  Number of weeks existing stock/reserves will last
How many weeks will your existing food 




n % n N
4 weeks or less 21 38.2 8 14.5
Between 5 and 8 weeks 4 7.3 5 9.1
More than 8 weeks 4 7.3 15 27.3
This is not an issue at present 19 34.5 16 29.1
Don’t know 7 12.7 11 20.0
Total 55 100 55 100
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to those in hardship: ears to listen, arms that are willing to 
hug, voices to offer sympathy (and recommendations and 
financial advice, if asked for) and people who are inclined 
to befriend without judging or requiring something in return. 
The crisis, however, meant much of this could not be offered, 
and some was entirely sacrificed for the entire duration of 
the lockdown—quite likely, when it was needed the most. 
In fact, 56.4% of participants said that COVID-19 had a 
major effect on the social atmosphere of the provider, and 
only three organizations (5.5%) reported no change in social 
atmosphere at all.
This unfortunate transformation is poignantly described 
by Innes, who works in a community centre that offered 
cooked meals and that had to provisionally transform into a 
takeaway service:
Whatever we had we would give away to people as 
they said they needed it. And then COVID happened 
and our doors closed. When the lockdown came 
about, when it was first mooted, we had to close the 
doors. And in that time when, before the lockdown 
was announced, I think was a short period of time, 
we decided to provide breakfast and lunch as a takea-
way service… So we were dealing with isolated peo-
ple across the whole range, the isolated people would 
come to us pre-COVID because we were a safe space, 
we were a welcoming space, and because they weren’t 
allowed to go in many cases to any other places… 
Our clients are very touchy-feely, you know. How 
the hell we could stop a lot of our clients wanting to 
give us a cuddle or pat us on the back, or shake our 
hand or whatever? You know, culturally, there were 
four guys who came from Sudan and anything we did, 
they wanted to shake our hands. Anything... we gave 
them a coffee, they wanted to shake my hand. And 
you know, the difficulty in not doing that now, the dif-
ficulty in not patting somebody on the back, the dif-
ficulty when you’re seeing somebody crying, not to 
give them a hug, you know, it’s... sorry, I’m going on 
a bit… COVID has sucked the life out of our centre. 
It’s taken what we were… Innes, Mixed food provider
This touching excerpt vividly conveys what was lost 
during the lockdown and how much the (indispensable) 
measures taken to contain the contagion conditioned the 
operations of the community centre. Innes makes it clear 
that food support providers have a social function, ‘sucked 
away’ by COVID-19, that goes well beyond the supply of 
meals or parcels. To an extent, even after the end of the first 
lockdown, many precautionary measures still mandated the 
avoidance of physical contact as freely as before COVID-19, 
thus leaving ‘the difficulty when you’re seeing somebody 
crying, not to give them a hug’ intact.
This dread was evoked by other interviewees. While the 
UK government was relaxing the first lockdown measures, 
Jane discussed how her food bank could reopen safely, and 
akin to Innes mused on the probable loss of the social aspect:
But then it’s a question of what PPE we use for the 
volunteers, and also whether we will be able to have 
sufficient volunteers if our older and less healthy peo-
ple say ‘I can’t take that risk’. So it will take a lot of 
working out; so we may lose the social aspect, we may 
have to say ‘sorry, we can’t have people coming in and 
relaxing and sitting down’. All we could do is provide 
a bag at the door, either a takeaway meal on one day 
and takeaway tins on the other, or something like that. 
Which for us will be a great shame, because like I say, 
for a lot of these people, it’s not just the food. It’s the 
social aspect, and it’s somewhere to sit. And for people 
who are actually literally homeless or for people who 
are having to live with friends and relatives where it’s 
a bit cramped and a bit on top of each other and a bit 
frictional, that space to just sit and relax and chat won’t 
be there. Jane, Independent food bank
In a moment of widespread generosity and gigantic effort 
to feed the most disadvantaged, the hidden costs weighed 
primarily on the most symbolic—and yet very tangi-
ble—aspects of providing food (support). Although some 
Table 6  Impact of COVID-
19 on various aspects of the 
organization
To what extent would you say COVID-19 has 
affected the following aspects of the organization
Financial 
stability
Management Functioning Social 
atmos-
phere
n % n % n % n %
1 Not at all 7 12.7 8 14.5 5 9.1 3 5.5
2 8 14.5 6 10.9 4 7.3 4 7.3
3 16 29.1 8 14.5 3 5.5 10 18.2
4 10 18.2 12 21.8 13 23.6 7 12.7
5 Very much so 14 25.5 21 38.2 30 54.5 31 56.4
Total 55 100 55 100 55 100 55 100
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organizations found other ways to offer that social function, 
for instance through messaging platforms and group phone 
calls, these were rather ersatz means of community-building 
rather than the real thing.12 In a sense, as ‘nutrition’ and 
‘sustenance’ took precedence over ‘eating’ and ‘commensal-
ity’, physical distancing became, for many, social distancing.
Concluding remarks
The spread of COVID-19 in the UK laid bare how much 
its retrenching welfare system relies on the third sector to 
support people in need. The case of food support provision 
is probably emblematic, as national and local government 
both leaned immediately on the existing third sector organi-
zations, aware they could count on their embeddedness in 
particular areas. Making use of first-hand data gathered in 
Greater Manchester immediately after the peak of the first 
‘wave’ of COVID-19, this paper aims to provide a detailed 
picture of how food support providers overcame obsta-
cles, and the complications and restrictions that character-
ised their responses to the emergency. I found three main 
considerations.
First, most food support providers did not turn eligible 
people away, even when volunteer and staff capacity was 
lacking or because food in stock was in short supply. The 
capacity to improvise and quickly readapt to the new cir-
cumstances, coupled with the great generosity shown by 
individuals and companies and the efficient distribution of 
any food surplus, allowed them to respond promptly to the 
increasing demands for their services.13 For instance, many 
shifted logistics operations from food pick-up to food deliv-
ery to help users that were ‘shielding’ themselves. Although 
a number of food support providers were forced to shut down 
after the lockdown owing to a lack of volunteers and/or 
funds, the ‘parallel welfare’ put in place was able to absorb 
the most imperative needs that emerged after the outbreak. 
At the same time, such a successful endeavour points to the 
fact that despite the increased need, accessing food for dis-
tribution has not been a significant challenge. Echoing Loh-
nes’ (2020) work on the perverse governance mechanisms 
tying together food waste production and charitable food 
distribution in West Virginia, this finding illustrates that food 
support providers can unwittingly become woven into the 
fabric of a schizoid (food) economy based on scarcity logics, 
excess production and regulation of abundance; this is even 
more applicable in extraordinary times.
Second, complications that many organizations had to 
face included an increasing workload that fell on the shoul-
ders of volunteers and staff members who continued to 
work while others were furloughed or shielding and also 
an increasing pressure to obtain sufficient food and finan-
cial resources to keep going. Interview participants, in par-
ticular, questioned whether food and monetary donations 
would steadily flow should additional lockdowns occur and 
often worried that the end of the furlough scheme and the 
possibility of a no-deal Brexit—both still plausible at the 
time of the interviews—would exacerbate the situation for 
many people who already struggled to make ends meet, 
especially over winter. This, in turn, could affect the capac-
ity of many organizations to respond, especially the most 
fragile ones, some of which had less than two months’ food 
or cash resources at the time of the survey. With the benefit 
of hindsight, we now know that some of those concerns were 
partly alleviated with the Brexit withdrawal agreement and 
with the extension of the furlough scheme until April 2021. 
The recently announced repeal of the £20-per-week uplift in 
universal credit from October 2021, however, casts a shadow 
on the future prospects of low-income families, who will see 
a drop in their income precisely when the country will hit its 
peak unemployment rate (The Guardian 2021).
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the necessity of 
maintaining the supply of food at all costs came with impor-
tant restrictions. The lockdown measures that followed the 
first ‘wave’ not only affected the financial stability and the 
management of these organizations, but actually undermined 
their ability to provide crucial ancillary services. Unfortu-
nately, physical distancing measures and shifts in logistics 
forced operators to change, and sometimes to suspend, 
engagement and interaction with people asking for support, 
which often meant weakening and devitalizing the very 
nature of that relationship. One might wonder whether, if 
the welfare state had been better able to take care of the most 
disadvantaged members of our societies, the many VCSE 
organizations solely dedicated to distributing food support 
during the crisis could have redirected their efforts towards 
many other forms of social inclusion, tailored on other needs 
of their users.
As recently pointed out by Dickinson (2020, p. 589), 
“it is not our supply systems that are breaking down and 
causing hunger, but our systems for ensuring people can 
access the food that exists which have been broken for a long 
time.” COVID-19 tested the strengths and weaknesses of 
our food provision system—a test we may need to get used 
12 Social networks and messaging platforms have helped many peo-
ple cope with the lockdown, across the socioeconomic spectrum. At 
the same time, COVID-19 has shed light on the magnitude of dig-
ital inequalities in the UK (Watts 2020), which in turn implies that 
switching social support online would not have the same reach as 
offline support.
13 Since food bank usage is a poor indicator of food insecurity 
(Loopstra and Tarasuk 2015), this is no guarantee that people did not 
experience hunger or did not cut back on other essentials in order to 
eat. It is possible that perspectives gained from ethnographic engage-
ment or interviews with people who tried to access the service could 
unveil difficulties in obtaining food aid during the crisis.
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to considering that short disruptive shocks characterise the 
Anthropocene (Benton 2020)—and showed what needs to be 
fixed to build a more just, inclusive, and sustainable future 
(Anderson 2020). The central role played by food charities 
and advocacy groups during the crisis could represent an 
important opportunity to re-orient policies to nourish com-
munities and protect agricultural livelihoods and labour, as 
there is now more awareness on how food is produced, dis-
tributed, and eventually arrives—or not—on people’s plates 
(Graddy-Lovelace 2020).
To conclude, some limitations should be addressed, and 
this study suggests future directions for research. One of the 
central objectives of this paper is to set down the extreme 
complexity of the emergency response deployed during the 
COVID-19 crisis. In my view, this could help us get an over-
arching understanding of the successes, the obstacles faced 
by and the prospects of food support provision in Greater 
Manchester and possibly beyond, as well as grasping how 
crucial its role has been (and continues to be) in such a harsh 
period. At the same time, I am fully aware that some organi-
zations may have experienced only bits and pieces of what is 
written here, and that their unique experiences could be par-
tially mischaracterized. Looking in detail, it is plausible that 
food banks, warm meal providers and food pantries had to 
overcome different challenges while reorganizing to face the 
crisis. However, trying to identify common patterns allows 
us to zoom in on idiosyncrasies within the sector at a later 
stage. Future case studies focusing on single organizations 
could take the findings here presented as a benchmark and 
dig deeper into how specific actions were taken. Further-
more, for lack of data I could not focus on the role played 
by Mutual Aid Groups (MAGs), which were often working 
side by side with many food aid services and providing com-
plementary forms of support thanks to their flexibility and 
informality (Reicher and Stott 2020). Systematic research 
on this elusive yet crucial part of the emergency response 
is still lacking and would further contribute to a thorough 
understanding.
On the methodological side, I should stress that, despite 
the satisfactory response rate and good variation in both the 
type and the location of food support providers who took 
part in both the survey and the interviews, positive selec-
tion bias could have occurred, as organizations experienc-
ing operational difficulties may have avoided taking part. 
If this was the case, it is possible that the research over-
estimates providers’ success in overcoming obstacles and 
underestimates the challenges met by these organizations in 
taking action. Moreover, it is likely that the UK experienced 
regional variations in the organization of the food emergency 
response that cannot be observed by looking solely at one 
metropolitan county, however varied it may be. This points 
to the lack of survey data available on food support provision 
at the national (and supranational) level. If a major survey of 
food support providers were available, the monitoring during 
the first months of COVID-19 would have been much faster, 
more valid, and more reliable. To date, survey data have usu-
ally been collected by food charities or food surplus distribu-
tors for internal monitoring purposes, only shared with some 
researchers (e.g. Loopstra et al. 2019b) and understandably 
subject to non-disclosure agreements Sometimes—as for 
this article—researchers collect their own survey data, hence 
facing high marginal costs that could be greatly reduced if 
economies of scale could be exploited; this approach also 
increases survey fatigue for respondents who are repeatedly 
asked to fill in similar questionnaires. The paramount role 
now played by food support providers in the UK, and more 
generally in Europe, requires a more integrated approach 
to data collection that transcends single types of providers 
or networks—and perhaps even countries—and that allows 
researchers access on demand to harmonised data on several 
aspects of food charities (and their users) and their evolution 
over time. This would allow researchers to analyse in greater 
detail how different organizations obtain and share resources 
and to highlight inequalities in the access to donation net-
works, depending on location and the type of food support 
provision offered (May et al. 2020). At the same time, food 
charities could count on the skills and knowledge of a much 
wider pool of experts, as well as on a detailed data resource, 
to help them advocate the right to obtain good food in a just 
food system.
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